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FEATURE ARTICLE
Playing with Fire: Assessing Lighter Manufacturers'
Duties Regarding Child Play Lighter Fires
by Thomas M. Peters and Hal 0. Carroll
I. INTRODUCTION
Disposable gas-fueled lighters offer consum-
ers greater convenience and probably greater
safety than matches. Lighters are more conve-
nient than matches because they last longer
than a book of matches and can be operated
with one hand. Since a dropped lighter extin-
guishes itself, while a dropped match continues
to burn, a lighter may be a safer product.
However, like many other products, lighters
can cause injury if they are defective, such as
when the plastic back cracks or the gas does
not shut off. With respect to defects, lighters
are no different from other products, so the
standard product liability laws apply.
What differentiates lighters from many other
products, however, is their potentially danger-
ous use by children. Even a defect-free lighter,
which functions as intended in the hands of an
adult, can cause serious harm when activated
by a child. For example, one source estimated
that children under age 5 cause 5,800 residen-
tial fires, 170 deaths, and 1,190 injuries each
year by playing with lighters.' Additionally,
the estimated amount of damage caused by
child lighter fires ranges from $300-375
million annually, and "dollar for dollar, these
lighters are involved in causing almost as
much damage through childplay as they gener-
ate in sales at the retail level."2
Three fundamental principles
of law and public policy emerge ThE
in these cases. First, a product Detro
that performs as designed is not practi
defective, and therefore gives
rise to no liability. Second, inclu6
society, recognizing the limita- lighte
tions of small children, expects
adults to ensure children's guard
safety. Finally, a lighter is a Ha
simple tool, and a simple tool, ,4onr
like a sharp knife, exhibits both an obvious
hazard and a usefulness inseparable from that
hazard. The interplay of these three principles
in child lighter fire cases has created some
difficulties for courts regarding each of the two
main duties associated with product liability
law - the duty to warn of possible hazards
and the duty to design and manufacture prod-
ucts that are not "unreasonably dangerous."
This article analyzes how courts and legisla-
tures have applied their states' product liability
law in child lighter fire cases. The article
focuses on the way courts alter traditional
product liability concepts in resolving child
lighter fire cases. First, the article introduces
some basic product liability concepts. Second,
the article addresses manufacturers' duty to
warn adults and children about the dangers of
child lighter fires. This section explains how
courts apply the "open and obvious" and "adult
product" doctrines in determining whether to
impose a duty upon manufacturers to warn of
the dangers created by using a lighter. Next,
the article details the different approaches used
by several states to outline manufacturers' duty
to childproof lighters. This section analyzes the
different theories underlying design liability in
various states and the ways that courts interpret
and apply statutory language defining this
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duty. Finally, the article describes the risk-
utility analysis employed by some courts to
balance the benefits offered by lighters against
the risks they present. In this section, the
author describes the factors courts examine in
applying the analysis, and the author suggests
other factors that should be included in courts'
analyses.
II. BACKGROUND
Different states formulate product liability
law in different ways. In some states, courts
have taken the lead in developing the law3
while legislatures have assumed this role in
other states.4 Regardless of whether a state's
product liability law is created by a legislature
or a court system, different states adopt differ-
ent legal theories underlying products liability.
Several states utilize a strict liability scheme to
define manufacturers' duties and to assess
liability.' By contrast, other states rely on a
traditional negligence theory to accomplish
these goals.6 Furthermore, in other states,
consumer expectations form the foundation of
product liability law.7
Underlying all of these theories is a funda-
mentally basic concept: the concept of "risk-
utility" analysis. This concept involves balanc-
ing the risks a product poses against its ben-
efits (otherwise known as its "utility"). Courts
usually perform the risk-utility analysis be-
cause they are responsible for deciding the
threshold question of whether a manufacturer
has a duty to warn and design reasonably safe
products.8 In many cases, the outcome of a
risk-utility analysis dictates whether a manu-
facturer has a particular duty. The standard
risk-utility analysis is complicated in child
lighter fire cases because these cases present
more intricate and more subtle "duty to warn"
issues than traditional product liability cases.
In addition, in child lighter fire cases, the adult
nature of the product and the varying abilities
of children further complicate the analysis.
Similarly, child lighter fire cases involve
design issues that differ from traditional
product liability cases because the lighters are
not defective when they injure a child or cause
property damage. Courts deciding these cases
do not complain, for example, that the lighter
failed to extinguish the flame when the user
released the lever, or that the lighter ruptured
and released butane. In child play lighter fire
cases, the lighter performs as designed - it
creates a flame - but causes injury because of
the person operating the product.
Since the sole purpose of a lighter is to make
a flame, the "open and obvious hazard" doc-
trine represents a common defense to product
liability lawsuits.9 Obviously, lighters create
flames. The real issue, however, is whether this
fact impacts a manufacturer's duty to warn or
to design a "safer," more child-resistant prod-
uct. The sections below address both the duty
to warn and the duty to design safer lighters in
detail.
IH. DO MANUFACTURERS OWE
CONSUMERS A DUTY TO WARN?
The basic question regarding "failure to
warn" liability is whether manufacturers have a
duty to warn consumers about the hazard of
fires caused by lighter use.'0 In child lighter
fire cases, there are two specific issues: (1)
whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adult purchasers of the hazards of child lighter
fires; 1 and (2) whether manufacturers have a
duty to warn children of the danger of lighter
fires. 12
When addressing a manufacturer's duty to
warn adults of the fire hazards associated with
adult use of lighters, courts have applied the
"open and obvious hazard" doctrine to negate
any duty to warn.'3 Under this doctrine,
manufacturers have no duty to warn adults
because the hazard is obvious to the intended
user. 4 Similarly, some courts have been
unwilling to impose upon manufacturers a duty
to warn children. 5 Often these courts base
their decisions on one or both of two facts: (1)
the danger is open and obvious; and (2) the
lighter is an adult product. 16 For example, in
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Adams v. Perry Furniture Co., the Court of
Appeals of Michigan determined that these two
facts negated any duty to warn the child user of
the danger of fires. 7 Rejecting the argument
that this danger is not open and obvious to a
child, the court stated that "the focus is the
typical user's perception"'' 8 and "the typical
user of a lighter is an adult."' 9 The court added
that warnings directed at children are of doubt-
ful value: "To the extent that children cannot
read any warning or understand the obvious
danger, we believe that a reasonably careful
purchaser would keep
the lighter from these
children." 0 Thus, the
court held that manu-
facturers have no duty If manuf
to warn adults or
children of general fire duty to warn
hazards associated with
lighter use.2' hazard resultJ
If manufacturers
have no duty to warn and no duty t
adults of the fire hazard
resulting from adult use the fire haza
and no duty to warn
children of the fire child use, th
hazard resulting from
child use, the next whether man
question is whether
manufacturers have a duty to warn a
duty to warn adults
about the fire hazard hazard created
created when children
use lighters. li!
A. The Traditional Approach
Most courts have not relied on legal theory
or public policy in resolving the issue of
whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adults about the hazard of child lighter fires.
Instead, these courts have resolved the issue by
considering the adequacy of the general warn-
ings provided by manufacturers and by con-
cluding, as a matter of law, that these general
warnings are sufficient to warn adults of the
hazards of child lighter fires.22 For example, in
Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee stated that the warning" 'KEEP
OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN' is suffi-
ciently calculated [as a matter of law] to notify
a reasonably prudent, ordinary consumer about
the nature and extent of the danger involved in
leaving a lighter around unsupervised chil-
dren."23
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
held that a lighter manufacturer "fulfills its
duty to warn by
warning the adult
purchasers of its
cturers have no products to keep
the lighters out of
adults of the fire the reach of chil-
dren."24 Although
ig from adult use these courts held
that the warnings
warn children of were adequate as a
matter of law, the
d resulting from courts' scrutiny of
the warnings seems
next question is to suggest that
manufacturers may
facturers have a have a duty to warn
adults about the
ults about the fire dangers inherent in
children's use of
when children use lighters.
B. Alabama Adopts a Different
Approach: Bean v. BIC Corp.
In addressing whether there is a duty to warn
adults about the danger of child lighter fires,
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the
warnings Tennessee and Michigan courts held
sufficient as a matter of law. The court found
that the adequacy of the warnings was not a
matter of law, but rather was a question of fact
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for the jury.25 In Bean v. BIC Corp., Plaintiffs
made three specific allegations about the
warnings that were not raised in Michigan or
Tennessee. First, Plaintiffs claimed that the
manufacturer "failed to warn about the attrac-
tiveness of the lighters to small children. 2 6
Second, they argued that the manufacturer
"failed to warn of the serious danger of fires
started by small children."27 Third, they
claimed that the manufacturer "failed to warn
that small children could easily operate the
lighters."28 The Bean court accepted Plaintiffs'
argument that these were questions for the jury,
but did so essentially without discussion.29
Plaintiffs' first argument, the "attractive-
ness" argument, is weak because Plaintiffs
have either assumed that: (1) lighters are
unusually attractive to children and courts
should therefore impose liability; or, alterna-
tively, (2) that courts should impose liability
even though lighters are only as attractive as,
but no more attractive than, other household
objects. The assumption that children are more
attracted to lighters than to other objects is an
unsupported assumption at best. More impor-
tantly, this assumption conflicts with the
common knowledge that small children ex-
plore the world by reaching for all objects.
This knowledge is evidenced by the broad
range of products which parents must keep
from small children, including such diverse
items as medicine, cleaning fluids, plastic
bags, knives, coins, and matches. Parents must
keep these items from small children because
children may injure themselves playing or
experimenting with them. Because the assump-
tion that lighters are unusually attractive to
children defies common knowledge, it should
not support the conclusion that manufacturers
have a duty to warn about the hazards of child
lighter fires.
With this argument, Plaintiffs in Bean would
have courts impose liability on lighter manu-
facturers for failing to warn adults that lighters
are attractive to children even though lighters
are no more attractive or dangerous than any of
the objects mentioned above. Imposing this
duty would raise serious public policy con-
cerns because it would create an artificial
distinction between different simple tools,
which are generally benign in the hands of an
adult yet potentially dangerous when handled
by children. If the Bean argument was adopted,
lighter manufacturers would owe consumers a
duty to warn while knife manufacturers would
not. Given the common risk of child injury
with both of these simple tools, there is no
principled basis for imposing liability for
failing to warn of a lighter's attractiveness to
children while declining to impose liability for
failure to warn of a knife's similar attractive
quality.
The second argument Plaintiffs raised in
Bean, the "serious danger" argument, is also
unpersuasive. This argument implies that
whether a manufacturer has a duty to explicitly
warn adults about the danger posed by child
lighter fires depends upon whether the danger
is actually associated with children playing
with lighters. This contention ignores the
universally recognized danger associated with
playing with fire, whatever its source. Given
the common knowledge of this danger, the
dangers of a fire created by a lighter are appar-
ent to the intended user. Therefore, the open
and obvious hazard doctrine should preclude a
court from imposing a duty to warn,30 and
courts should not make a lighter
manufacturer's duty to warn of basic fire
dangers a question of fact.3'
The strength of the third argument advanced
in Bean, that children can operate lighters,
differs sharply from that of the first and second
contentions. This argument supports the claim
that parents should be warned that "small
children could easily operate the lighters. 32
The Bean court's decision to submit this issue
to a jury is more defensible than its decision to
submit Plaintiff's first two arguments to the
jury because this issue, unlike the other two,
raises questions of fact. Specifically, it raises
questions regarding the strength and dexterity
required to operate a lighter. Given these
questions of fact, the court submitted the duty
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issue to the jury rather than hold, as a matter of
law, that manufacturers have a duty to warn
consumers about the ease with which children
can operate lighters.3 Although no other state
has specifically addressed this argument, the
tenor of the Tennessee and Michigan decisions
strongly suggests that they would reject it on
policy grounds.34
Courts adopting the Bean approach would
force manufacturers to charge higher prices for
lighters. As a result, consumers would have to
pay more for lighters without a corresponding
increase in efficiency or performance. On the
other hand, consumers would benefit from
increased warnings in states which embrace the
Bean approach. In those states, manufacturers
may provide more specific warnings to mini-
mize liability for failure to warn. This response
may lead to improved lighter safety for con-
sumers. Of course, relative costs and benefits
would have to be weighed to determine the
ultimate outcome for consumers.
C. Current Status of the Law
In all jurisdictions, courts unanimously hold
that there is no duty to warn children of the
hazard of child lighter fires; therefore, manu-
facturers will usually escape liability on this
theory.3 5 In addition, except for Alabama,
courts either hold that there is no duty to warn
adult purchasers of the hazard of child fires,36
or that a simple "[k]eep out of reach of chil-
dren" warning is sufficient. 37 Alabama stands
alone in permitting a failure to warn claim for
child lighter fire cases.38 To resolve the issue
of whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adults, the overwhelming majority of state
courts employ conventional analyses based on
the obviousness of the hazard, the nature of the
lighter, and its function.39 However, with
respect to the second duty of product liability,
the duty to design a reasonably safe product,
the law is not as consistent.
DO MANUFACTURERS HAVE A
DUTY TO DESIGN
"CHILDPROOF" LIGHTERS?
The second unique legal problem created by
child play lighter fires is the issue of whether
manufacturers have a duty to design lighters
that are inoperable by most children, otherwise
known as the "design duty."'' The feasibility
of child-resistant lighters is supported by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's
adoption of a child-resistance standard for
lighters.4 The standard requires that 85% of
the child test panel, comprised of children
under five years old, be unable to operate the
lighter.42 Arguably, reducing the percentage of
young children capable of operating a lighter
would result in a measurable societal safety
benefit with no corresponding decrease in
lighter utility. To date, however, this proposi-
tion has been neither confirmed nor disproved
by empirical data.
States have analyzed the design duty issue
differently because of the varied legal theories
underlying each state's product liability law.43
The three main types of product liability
theories currently embraced by states are: (1)
the consumer expectation theory; (2) the
negligence combined with strict liability
theory; and (3) the refusal to impose design
duty, even for foreseeable users. Despite the
differences between these legal theories, the
cases are surprisingly uniform in their re-
sults.' Specifically, courts appear reluctant to
hold manufacturers liable in child play lighter
fire cases for failing to design childproof
lighters because the lighters worked as in-
tended by creating a flame.45 The uniformity in
the results suggests that the details of each
state's product liability theories are much less
important than the particular court's perception
of the underlying real-world facts relating to
the purpose of lighters and the concept of
parental responsibility.
Loyola University Chicago School of Law 9 3431997
A. Consumer Expectation Theory
One theory employed by courts determining
a manufacturer's design duty is the "consumer
expectation" theory.' Under this theory, the
expectation of the "ordinary consumer" dic-
tates whether a manufacturer has a design duty,
and thus, ultimately determines whether a
manufacturer will be liable for designing a
lighter that can be operated by children.47
1. States Requiring Defective AND
Unreasonably Dangerous Products
Because Indiana's legislature statutorily
adopted the consumer expectation theory, an
examination of the relevant statute is benefi-
cial. Indiana's product liability law provides in
pertinent part:
One who sells, leases, or otherwise
puts into the stream of commerce
any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to any user
or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm
caused by that product to the con-
sumer or to his property if that user
or consumer is in the class of persons
that the seller should reasonably
foresee as being subject to the harm
caused by the defective condition.48
This section of the Indiana statute defines
the class of potential plaintiffs as those whom a
seller should reasonably foresee as subject to
harm. Since children are a class of plaintiffs
which a seller could reasonably foresee as
subject to harm from lighters, the Indiana
statute may extend the manufacturer's design
duty to children. Furthermore, a product is
"defective" under Indiana law if it performs in
a way that is not contemplated by "expected
users."49 The phrase "expected users" also
arguably encompasses the concept of foresee-
able users - users who might plausibly
include children. However, Indiana's statutory
definition of an unreasonably dangerous
product 0 restricts the class of plaintiffs to
"ordinary consumers." The relevant section of
the Indiana statute provides: "a product is
unreasonably dangerous if it: exposes the user
or consumer to a risk of physical harm to an
extent beyond that contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchases it." 5'
In Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., the Indiana
Court of Appeals applied this statutory scheme
in the context of child lighter fires. The Welch
court found that lighters are not unreasonably
dangerous because "[t]he ordinary consumer of
a lighter is an adult and the ordinary adult
consumer contemplates the risks posed by a
lighter, including the dangers associated with
children who play with lighters." 51 The court
explained that "regardless of foreseeability,
liability does not attach under the statute unless
the product in question is in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition."53 Accord-
ingly, Indiana law imposes no duty on manu-
facturers to childproof lighters because these
products are not unreasonably dangerous to
ordinary consumers: adults.
2. States Requiring Defective OR
Unreasonably Dangerous Products
Like Indiana, Tennessee defines product
liability by statute,' 4 and Tennessee also
distinguishes between "defective products" and
"unreasonably dangerous" products.5 Unlike
Indiana, which requires that a product be both
defective and unreasonably dangerous for a
design duty to be imposed, Tennessee's con-
sumer expectation test requires that a plaintiff
prove that a lighter is either defective or
unreasonably dangerous in order for a design
duty to be imposed.56
Under Tennessee's consumer expectation
test, a "defective" product is one "unsafe for
normal or anticipatable handling and consump-
tion. ' 57 Like Indiana's "expected users" con-
cept, Tennessee's "anticipatable handling"
standard suggests that a manufacturer may owe
344 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter Volume 9, number 4
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a design duty to foreseeable users of its prod-
ucts. Furthermore, the Tennessee statute
defines an "unreasonably dangerous" product
as one that is:
dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it,
or a product [that] because of its
dangerous condition would not be
put on the market by a reasonably
prudent manufacturer or seller
assuming that [the manufacturer or
seller] knew of its dangerous condi-
tion.58
In determining whether a product is unrea-
sonably dangerous, Tennessee courts have held
that the "ordinary consumers" of lighters are
adults, not minor children.59
In Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee applied Tennessee's
version of the consumer expectation test to a
child play lighter fire case. First, the Curtis
court held that the lighter was not defective
"because it performed in the manner expected.
.. [It] produced a flame when operated which
conformed to its normal and anticipated use.'6°
Next, the court held that the lighter was not
unreasonably dangerous because the "ordinary
adult consumer" understood and appreciated
the danger posed by children's use of light-
ers. 6 1 By interpreting the statute's "ordinary
consumer" language as applying only to adult
consumers, the Curtis court implicitly rejected
the notion that lighter manufacturers owe all
foreseeable users a duty to design childproof
products. The court also emphasized that
Tennessee law does not require manufacturers
to design perfect or accident-proof products.62
Instead, manufacturers only have to design
products which are not defective or unreason-
ably dangerous to the ordinary adult user, as
described above.
In summary, as the Welch and Curtis deci-
sions illustrate, courts applying the consumer
expectation theory have limited the lighter
manufacturers' design duty to design lighters
for the intended users of the product: adults.
Although the relevant statutes suggest that the
Indiana and Tennessee legislatures may have
intended to protect foreseeable users of light-
ers, the courts have narrowed the potential
scope of these state statutes by construing the
protection of these laws to apply only to adult
users.
B. Combining Negligence and Strict
Liability Theories
Product liability law in Pennsylvania applies
both a negligence standard - which tradition-
ally extends manufacturers' design duty to all
foreseeable users - and a strict liability
standard. Courts applying this hybrid approach
in child fire cases have reached nontraditional
and unexpected results.
In Griggs v. BIC Corp.,63 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted
that the strict liability prong of the Pennsylva-
nia analysis is based on Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 64 Section 402A
provides: "One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer... [i]s subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property." 65
Based on this standard, Plaintiff in Griggs
argued that a lighter was unreasonably danger-
ous to foreseeable users, and thus defective,
because it was not childproof.6 The Third
Circuit rejected this contention, agreeing with
the district court that "a product may not be
deemed defective unless it is unreasonably
dangerous to intended users. 67 Specifically,
the court found that, under Pennsylvania law,
"foreseeability ... plays no part in the initial
determination of defect in strict liability. 68
Next, the court explained that "because chil-
dren are not intended users, [the lighter manu-
facturer] is not strictly liable. ' 69 Thus, the
Griggs court's conclusion on the strict liability
portion of the analysis mirrored that reached
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by the Welch court.
However, the Griggs court reached the
opposite result under the negligence prong.
Since foreseeability forms the basis of negli-
gence liability, manufacturers owe a duty to "a
different subset of the population, and one that
is conceivably broader: a duty to anyone who
foreseeably may be subject to an unreasonable
risk of harm."70 On this basis, the court applied
the risk-utility analysis and held that a viable
design liability claim could result from a
manufacturer's failure to make a lighter child-
resistant.7' Thus, in Pennsylvania, the
manufacturer's design duty is greater under
ordinary negligence than under strict liability.
This result highlights a long-recognized misno-
mer: although "strict liability" implies liabil-
ity without fault, it
actually requires fault
because it requires a
defect in a
manufacturer's prod- Unlike th
uct. As discussed
below, courts in other in Indiana v
states have employed
different theories to Alabama c
reach substantially
similar results.
Unlike their coun- limited manu!
terparts in Indiana and duty to ad
Tennessee, Alabama
courts have not limited
manufacturers' design
duty to adult purchas-
ers. Alabama courts
define a "defective" product as one failing to
meet the "reasonable expectation of an ordi-
nary consumer as to its safety."72 Although the
"ordinary consumer" language appears to limit
the manufacturers' design duty to adults,
Alabama law defines "unreasonable danger" as
foreseeable danger which overrides the restric-
tive "ordinary consumer" language.73
The reasoning the court used to reach this
result in Bean is unclear. In one sentence the
court refers to "the reasonable expectations of
an ordinary consumer."74 The next sentence
describes the danger as "unreasonable when it
is foreseeable. 7 5 The following sentence
concludes that "therefore" foreseeability
constitutes the appropriate test.76 After identi-
fying foreseeability as the operative concept,
the Alabama court reasoned that "[d]uty in this
State remains a function of foreseeability of
the harm tempered by a consideration of the
feasibility of an alternative."77 The court
concluded that manufacturers owe consumers a
duty to make lighters child-resistant because
the court was unwilling to make "the sweeping
and decisive pronouncement that a manufac-
turer of a product that it intends to be used by
adults never has a duty to make the product
safer by making it child-resistant when the
dangers are foreseeable and prevention of the
danger is reason-
able."78
The New York
Supreme Court
reached a similar
r counterparts result in Campbell v.
id Tennessee, BIC Corp.7 9 In
Campbell, the court
reasoned that "there
irts have not is almost no differ-
ence between a
cturers' design negligence cause of
action and one
purchasers, sounding in strict
products liability."80
The court held that
New York law
imposed a duty
upon manufacturers when consumers used
products "for an unintended but foreseeable
use."" The Campbell court appeared to use a
variation of the concept of a foreseeable
misuse. No other New York court has applied
this concept to expand the category of users
owed a duty.
These cases suggest a neat dichotomy: a
manufacturer's duty to design child-resistant
lighters usually exists where liability turns on
who is a foreseeable user (Pennsylvania in
Griggs, Alabama in Bean, and New York in
346 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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Campbell), but does not ordinarily exist where
liability is based on an intended user (Pennsyl-
vania in Griggs, Indiana in Welch, Tennessee
in Curtis). However, this framework is not
universal. As discussed fully in the following
section, courts in some states refuse to impose
design duty on lighter manufacturers even
when liability is based on foreseeability.
C. Courts That Refuse to Impose Design
Duty, Even for Foreseeable Users
Conventional negligence theory holds
manufacturers liable for injuries to foreseeable
users of products. Thus, manufacturers owe all
foreseeable users a duty to design reasonably
safe products. This theory greatly expands the
class of potential plaintiffs in product liability
actions because plaintiffs must only be foresee-
able, rather than intended, users of the product.
As described above, in Pennsylvania, Alabama,
and New York, manufacturers have been held
liable when they owed a design duty to fore-
seeable users. However, courts in some states
deviate from this common framework and hold
that manufacturers do not owe a design duty to
all foreseeable users.
For example, Michigan courts have deviated
from the common framework. In Michigan,
product liability law has two branches: im-
plied warranty and negligence. Although in
negligence actions, duty is based on foresee-
ability, one Michigan appellate court held that
manufacturers owed no duty to design child-
resistant lighters, even though child fires are
foreseeable.82 In Adams v. Perry Furniture
Co., the parties agreed that children might
foreseeably handle lighters and injure them-
selves. Nevertheless, the court declined to
impose a design duty on the manufacturer,
explaining: "[w]e are not persuaded that the
risk of this danger imposes a duty upon the
manufacturer of the lighter to make it child-
resistant in light of the fact that the product is
intended to be sold to adults. '83 Thus, the
Michigan court injected the "intended user"
concept into the foreseeability equation and
limited the duty that manufacturers would
otherwise shoulder under a pure foreseeability
theory.
It is interesting to compare the approaches
of the Michigan and Alabama courts. Michigan
used the intended user concept to override the
foreseeable user theory, thereby limiting the
duty, while Alabama used foreseeability to
expand the scope of the duty that would have
applied under its consumer expectation ("in-
tended user") test.
A subsequent case decided by a different
panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals dis-
agreed with the Adams decision. In
Boumelhem v. BIC Corp., the court criticized
the Adams decision and stressed that Michigan
follows a pure negligence standard requiring a
foreseeability analysis.84 "In a case alleging
defective design, Michigan has adopted a pure
negligence, risk-utility test for determining
whether a defendant has breached its duty of
care in designing a product."85 The court also
rejected the argument that lighters are simple
tools exhibiting obvious danger, which elimi-
nates the design duty.86 The ultimate answer on
Michigan law, however, remains unclear
because its supreme court has declined to
review either the Adams or Boumelhem deci-
sions.
Similarly, a federal district court applying
Missouri law refused to impose a duty to make
a lighter child-resistant, even under a negli-
gence theory. In Sedlock v. BIC Corp., the
United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri ruled that "Missouri law
explicitly holds that manufacturers are not
liable for failure to make adult products child
proof."87
D. The Bottom Line: Most States Belong
to One of Three Camps
The cases analyzed above demonstrate that
courts generally fall into one of three camps. In
some states, manufacturers' duty to design
childproof lighters hinges on whether children
are intended users of the product. Courts in
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 3471997
these states are reluctant to saddle manufactur-
ers with such a duty. In the opposing camp,
design liability hinges on whether children are
foreseeable users. Courts in these states have
imposed a duty to design childproof lighters on
manufacturers. In the third camp, courts are
unwilling to impose any design duty upon
lighter manufacturers, even under a traditional
negligence theory based on foreseeability.
Consumers should be somewhat unsettled
by this wide range of possible results. Since
the opinions illustrate no clear trend, it is
difficult to predict whether manufacturers will
modify existing lighter design to increase their
products' safety. Currently, lighters are rela-
tively inexpensive, widely available products
which generally perform as designed. How-
ever, the substantial damage caused by child
play lighter fires has caused some courts to
reexamine design liability for lighter manufac-
turers. If courts saddle manufacturers with a
duty to design childproof products, manufac-
turers may respond by increasing the product's
price or limiting lighters' availability only to
states which refuse to impose such a duty. The
next several years could prove crucial to the
future of the disposable lighter industry. Con-
sumers could experience higher lighter prices
and/or limited availability, depending on the
approach adopted by courts in a given state.
V. RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS - A
BALANCING APPROACH
The risk-utility analysis underlies the appli-
cation of both the duty to warn and the design
duty. Regardless of which legal theory a court
applies, the court usually performs the risk-
utility analysis as an aid in determining a
manufacturer's duty to warn or design duty.88
Generally, courts employ this analysis to weigh
the risk posed by a product against the
product's usefulness. For example, the Griggs
court recognized that "a finding of duty in
negligence [turns] on the last remaining piece
of the traditional duty puzzle: whether the
foreseeable risks were unreasonable."89 In
Griggs, the Third Circuit utilized the risk-
utility analysis to conclude that the risk of
harm to children operating lighters was unrea-
sonable. Accordingly, the court held that "the
manufacturer would have a duty to guard
against the unreasonable risk of harm by
designing the lighter to be childproof." 90
In child lighter cases, the key risk factor is
easily identified - the risk of injury from fires
started by small children. In Griggs, for ex-
ample, the Third Circuit examined statistical
evidence of deaths and injuries caused by such
fires.91
Unfortunately, most court decisions fail to
identify the appropriate utility factors. For
example, the Griggs court held that two factors
were relevant to the utility prong of the analy-
sis: "the social value of the interest which the
actor is seeking to advance," and "any alterna-
tive course open to the actor."92 Applying these
criteria, the court held that "the only interest
[the lighter manufacturer] can be seeking to
advance.., is one of cost and its own eco-
nomic health." 93 This facile reasoning illus-
trates the importance of careful consideration
for the utility aspect of the balancing test. By
defining the issue as one of "social utility," and
ignoring everyone except the seller, the Griggs
court rendered the risk-utility analysis mean-
ingless. The court erred by limiting "utility" to
profit. The better approach would look beyond
mere profit and emphasizes a product's utility
to society as a whole, including intended users.
Furthermore, the Griggs analysis ignores the
relative utility of alternate sources of fire. The
proper analysis contemplates the relative value
of alternative sources of fire in weighing the
utility of lighters.
VI. COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW
This article has described how courts alter
traditional product liability concepts in resolv-
ing child play lighter fire cases. Additionally,
this article has identified the trends reflected in
recent child fire cases. In the duty to warn area,
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the cases reflect different analyses yet consis-
tent results, with Alabama being the lone
exception. Though they employ different
analyses, Indiana, Michigan, and Tennessee
courts, for example, agree that manufacturers
owe consumers no duty to warn. The differ-
ences in analysis reflect each state's unique
formulation of its own product liability law.
The uniformity of
results reflects the
consensus that light-
ers are adult products, Though t]
which do not require
warnings to children. explicitly com
This suggests that
common sense, or at to fires caused
least a common
understanding, rather comparison
than a consistent legal
theory, drives the unarticulate
analysis.
Similarly, the deci
design duty opinions
display more consis-
tency in result than in
courts' analyses in reaching these results.
Where the text of a state's liability statute
might permit one result, state courts have often
reached a different result without even address-
ing the statutory language. For example, an
Alabama court seeking to impose liability used
"foreseeability" to cancel the limitations of its
statute's "ordinary consumer" language.94 By
contrast, a Tennessee court declined to impose
liability although the statute's "anticipatable
handling" language suggested it could do so.95
Though the courts have used a broad range of
reasoning to come to their conclusions, their
holdings have been consistent.
A broad consistency in result emerges. The
opinions extensively discuss both the policy
underlying manufacturers' duty to make
lighters child-resistant, and the factual reality
underlying the policy. With the exception of
Alabama, 96 and a non-controlling Michigan
case, 97 courts have declined to impose a duty to
make non-defective products safer by making
them child-resistant.
Though the cases do not explicitly compare
lighter fires to fires caused by matches, that
comparison may form an unarticulated basis of
the decisions. A match starts a fire as well as a
lighter. Matches are easy to light, and the heat
of a burning match is virtually certain to cause
a child to drop it. Unlike a lighter, a match will
not go out when
dropped. However,
cases of children
e cases do not starting fires by
playing with matches
are lighter fires do not generate
litigation against
y matches, that matchbook compa-
nies. Perhaps the
may form an best explanation for
this result is histori-
I basis of the cal, not legal. Fires
resulting from
ions. matches have oc-
curred as long as
matches have ex-
isted, long before
product liability law emerged. On the other
hand, inventors developed lighters after prod-
uct liability law matured. Therefore, courts are
more willing to view lighters as "products,"
though lighters perform the same function as
matches and consumers operate both by hand.
In several of the cases surveyed, courts seem
to employ legal analysis not so much to deter-
mine the result as to justify it. Several of the
courts easily could have reached different
results if the courts had applied theory more
rigidly. Instead, the typical analysis tends to
spring from a strong sense of the underlying
factual and social realities of childhood haz-
ards. Although courts seldom articulate this
rationale, it is a powerful force driving the
outcome of a majority of cases and explains
the courts' general reluctance to impose either
a duty to warn or a duty to design childproof
lighters on manufacturers. As child lighter fire
litigation multiplies, courts may be forced to
reevaluate their positions.
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